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Eros and Agape in Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics  
David Clough 
Abstract: This analysis of agape and eros in the Church Dogmatics argues 
that although there are real difficulties with Barth's development of these 
concepts in the Dogmatics, a careful reading of the material suggests that 
these difficulties are not so serious as may first appear and may be 
overcome. This interpretative work also facilitates a dialogue between 
Barth and two contemporary ethicists working on the concept of Christian 
love, a dialogue in which Barth proves to be a worthy and rewarding 
partner. 
Barth's treatment of eros and agape in the Church Dogmatics poses three difficulties for his 
interpreters. First, he attaches five different meanings to ‘eros' in the course of the work 
and it is not clear that they are consistent with one another. Second, the relationship 
between agape and this diffuse understanding of eros is problematic: Barth states that the 
two are enemies of one another, but also rejects a simple opposition and attributes to eros 
qualities he identifies with agape. Third, the meaning of agape is rendered uncertain by 
Barth's ambiguity regarding its proper object. My aim in this article is to set out each of the 
three difficulties and in each case determine whether it represents a real problem in Barth's 
account, and, if so, whether there is a way to overcome the problem. I conclude that there 
are real difficulties with Barth's description of eros and agape in the Dogmatics, but that 
none is incorrigible, and that the tensions in his attempts to wrestle with eros and agape 
are instructive for our own contemporary struggles with the meaning of Christian love.1 
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The five meanings of eros
Barth's references to eros in the Dogmatics can be classified under five headings: eros
as a power of human creativity, eros as sexual desire, the eros of Greek philosophy,
sanctified eros between husband and wife, and eros as self-love.2
The first appearance of eros in the Dogmatics is as a broad human fecundity not
restricted to sex, and carrying a positive evaluation as a proper human activity.3 In
explaining why the miracle of the Virgin Birth is necessary, he explains
The sinful life of sex is excluded as the source of the human existence of Jesus Christ,
not because of the nature of the sexual life nor because of its sinfulness, but because
every natural generation is the work of willing, achieving, creative, sovereign man.
No event of natural generation will be a sign of the mystery indicated here. Such an
event will point to the mighty and really cosmic power of human creaturely eros...
The event of sex cannot be considered at all as the sign of the divine agape which
seeks not its own and never fails.4
On the following page he again identifies eros with this human creativity, noting that
'willing, achieving, creative, sovereign man, man as an independent fellow-worker with
God, man in the impulse of his eros' cannot be 'a participator in God's work'.5
In his doctrine of creation, Barth treats eros as purely sexual desire. He is struck by
how unusual Genesis 2 is in its preparedness to speak of love between man and
woman. The Old Testament considers human sexuality 'almost exclusively in connexion
with the procreation of the holy seed and therefore the hope of Israel, and therefore its
determination and Messianic expectation', Barth notes, and the only other place in which
erotic love is treated more than
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incidentally is the Song of Songs.6 For this eros, he observes, 'there is no such thing as
shame' and he asks how the authors found the courage to treat their theme in this way,
'speaking so bluntly of eros and not being content merely with the restrained and in its own
way central reference to marriage and posterity'.7 Barth's answer is that at these two
points an 'inner necessity breaks through every reservation, God the Lord and sexual eros,
well known in Israel especially as a dangerous dæmon, are brought into close
relationship'. This necessity is that the authors of these passages see beyond the
broken covenant of Israel: 'they know that the broken covenant is still for God the
unbroken covenant, intact and fulfilled on both sides; that as such it was already the
inner basis of creation, and that as such it will again be revealed at the end'. Love and
marriage
become to them in some sense irresistibly a parable and sign of the link which Yahweh
has established between Himself and His people, which in His eternal faithfulness He
has determined to keep, and which He for His part has continually renewed. In this
way they irresistibly see even this most dangerous sphere of human existence in its
old and new glory.8
In this context, then, Barth qualifies the eros he is discussing by the term 'sexual' and
sees it as dangerous, but nonetheless capable of representing the covenant.
Later in the doctrine of creation, in his section on Christian anthropology, Barth
discusses the eros of the Greeks. After defining the basic form of humanity as a glad being
with one's fellows, he is quick to distinguish this characteristic of humanity from
Christian love. He then comments that agape and eros can be too easily played off
against one another. In Greek religion, eros was
the sum of human fulfilment and exaltation of life, the experience, depicted and
magnified with awe and rapture, of the end and beginning of all choice and volition, of
being in transcendence of human being, of that which can take place in sensual or
sexual (and thus in the narrower sense erotic) intoxication, but also in an inner spiritual
encounter with the suprasensual and suprarational, with the incomprehensible yet
present origin of all being and knowledge, in the encounter with the Godhead and union
in it. Eros is humanity as dæmonism in both the lowest and the highest sense, and as
such it is a kind of divinity.9
Christianity has frequently defined eros badly as the eros of 'the Dionysius-
Zarathustra, the superman, the man without his fellow man'. Agape has then been
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'far too unthinkingly accepted merely as an antithesis to Greek eros and thus
unconsciously depicted and extolled in the contours and colours of the original'. We
have to ask seriously 'whether what is called agape is not really a spiritualised,
idealised, sublimated, and pious form of eros'.10 Barth suggests that 'a calmer and
more objective solution' to the problem of the relationship between eros and agape is
to escape the simple opposition between them by introducing a third term: humanity.
We can then see that, while 'Greek eros is ill-adapted to be a definition of humanity',
nonetheless, it 'contains an element which in its visible form and even in its essence
is not evil or reprehensible, but of decisive ... importance for the concept of
humanity.'11 This element is being gladly with the other: The Greeks with their eros -
and it was no inconsiderable but a very real achievement - grasped the fact that the
being of man is free, radically open, willing, spontaneous, joyful, cheerful and
gregarious.'12 In this section, Barth sets out a detailed and nuanced description of
the Greek form of eros and celebrates this element of gladly being together as an
important insight into human nature.
The fourth meaning Barth ascribes to eros is found still later in the doctrine of
creation, in his account of human creatureliness as male and female. Here he
criticizes the critics of eros again. While he balks at the attempt to portray eros as a
way to Christian love,13 he asserts that ‘The Christian discrimination against eros as
such is undoubtedly a very old mistake. It never meant anything but that the Church
would not and could not see male and female in their real encounter, which must
always be to some extent erotic.'14 And again in his discussion of marriage, Barth's
criticism of Schleiermacher's idealism is tempered by the recognition that it 'is in any
event more human than the hostility shown to eros' by the authors he cites who claim
that love is not an important aspect of marriage.15 Barth himself is far from hostile to
eros in this section:
But good care must be take that what takes place between true lovers is
understanding, self-giving and desire. When the matter is understood in this
breadth and order, it may be safely and fearlessly described by the well-known
term eros. If we think of eros only as or primarily in the sense of desire, and more
particularly of physical desire, we must not suppose that we have really
understood what is here in question. As the desire of love, of true eros, desire is
legitimate ... when it is preceded by self-giving and thus controlled, not by the
need of the other, but by the joy of being his and of willing to belong to him,
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the confidence of being well-placed with him, the willingness to make common
cause with him. Again, this self-giving, as that of love, of genuine eros, is legitimate...
This then, in this totality and order, is love, the genuine eros sanctified by the
command of God.16
Of the four meanings of eros surveyed to this point, two do not raise problems of
consistency. When Barth qualifies the term, as he does in his treatment of 'sexual' and
'Greek' eros, there is no difficulty. The problems in interpretation arise when Barth uses
the term without qualification in ways that are not in agreement with each other, as he
does when he calls eros as a 'willing, achieving, creative' human power in I/2, or as
'understanding, self-giving and desire' in III/4.
These problems are exacerbated in IV/2 when Barth introduces a further
unqualified description of eros as self-love. In an extensive comparison with agape, Barth
here characterizes eros as a love with its origin in 'a distinctively uncritical intensification
and strengthening of natural self-assertion'. This love is 'hungry, and demands the food
that the other seems to hold out', which is 'the reason for its interest in the other'. It is the
'desire to possess and control and enjoy' what the other promises. It is finally selfish:
'however much [man] may seem to give what is his, lavishing and dissipating it on the
object of his love, he does not really give it up, but uses it as the means to win or keep
or enjoy this object of his love'. The movement of the love is circular: 'It seeks the
infinite in a transcendence of everything finite, but from the very first it is disposed in
such a way that (even by way of the infinite) it must always return to its beginning". It
may direct itself to 'the good, the true and the beautiful' rather than the sensual, or 'may
even reach out to the Godhead in its purest form and thus be a most wonderful love of
God'. But 'in all its forms it will always be a grasping, taking, possessive love - self-love
-and in some way and at some point it will always betray itself as such'.17 Barth refers
here to Greek eros as one of the forms of this love, which may begin to give us hope of
some kind of reconciliation of some of the previous uses of eros we have identified. What
he called sexual eros is obviously also an aspect of this kind of love. The more difficult
question is how the two unqualified definitions of eros as willing, achieving and creative
power, and as understanding, self-giving and desire, fit with this depiction.
To address this, it is helpful to follow Barth's comparison with agape here a little further.
Barth identifies it as 'the direct opposite of Christian love', but also recognizes that there
are reasons to be careful in criticizing it. The first is that 'in a crude or subtle form (and
perhaps both)' all Christians love in this way too; the second, that 'this other love can
claim some of the greatest figures in the history of
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the human spirit'; the third that we all 'exist in a world which in its best and finest as well
as its most basic phenomena is for the most part built upon this other rather than
Christian love'.18 Barth is consistent in stressing the importance of not forming 'too
impoverished a conception' of eros, or seeking it only in degenerate forms. It is a human
phenomenon reaching back to the beginnings of history, its power evident in the way it
'invaded Christian thought' in caritas. 'As long as men love', Barth observes, 'even though
they are Christians they will always live within the framework of eros.'19 This description
of eros as a historical phenomenon of human creativity undoubtedly incorporates the
willing, achieving, creative cosmic eras from Volume I. Despite this high view of eros,
however, Barth insists that Christian love and eros are 'two movements in opposite
directions' so that there can only be conflict between them. The first sense of eras we
found in I/2, then, is incorporated into the definition of eras as always finally self-love in
IV/2. This does require a re-evaluation of eras - in I/2 Barth spoke more positively of it -
but it is clear that Barth is discussing the same topic.
With regard to the first difficulty in Barth's account of eros and agape I identified
above, then, my provisional conclusion is that, while Barth does not attempt to make
his uses of eros consistent, three of the senses of eros I have identified - eros as
willing and achieving, eros as sexual desire, and the Greek concept of eros - can all be
understood in Barth's terms under the heading of the eros that is always finally self-
love. In the case of Greek eros this manoeuvre requires a little more work: the glad
fellow-humanity Barth recognizes as part of the positive component of Greek eros in III/2
is clearly not self-love. Both in III/2 and III/4, however, Barth includes this fellow-humanity
as part of his description of humanity.20With this part of Greek eros already incorporated in
Barth's doctrine of creation, we need only find room for the remainder of the Greek idea of
eros under the heading of self-love, which fits much more readily. The remaining sense of
eros not incorporated under self-love is the 'sanctified' eros of marriage, which bears on
the second difficulty with Earth's account of eros and agape I identified at the outset:
the relationship between eros and agape.
The relationship between eros and agape
The first problem with Earth's account here is that the 'sanctified' eros he describes in III/4
has affinities with both eros and agape, since it includes both desire and self-giving.
There seem to be three possibilities in interpreting Earth's intentions, none of which is
immediately attractive. First, we could say that this eros belongs with all the other uses
of eros we have identified: a love with some attractive
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features but at root a love of self in conflict with agape and from which Christians must
escape. This has the virtue of tidiness, but it makes little sense to say that God sanctifies
an action that is an enemy of Christian love, it makes love in marriage incompatible with
Christian discipleship, and it puts Barth in the same category as all the enemies of eros
he criticized. We must reject this alternative. The second possibility is that this sanctified
eros has nothing in common with eros as self-love, but in fact is an aspect of agape.
Barth defines it as including desire, however, which seems to make it more similar to
eros, and, while this sanctified eros incorporates self-giving, Barth insists that it
legitimately includes an interest in and choice of the other, which is no part of the pure
self-giving of agape. Barth deliberately chose to call the love in marriage eros
instead of agape, and complained that the church had failed to understand in the past
that there is always an erotic element in the relationship between man and woman. It is
not fruitful, then, to undo this by reincorporating this sanctified eros into agape. The
third possibility we are left with is that by the grace of God it is possible for an element of
eros to be transformed and sanctified into something holy between marriage partners. I
think this possibility is what Barth has in mind, but it does not fit easily with the deep gulf
and either/or between eros and agape he develops in Volume IV, which is perhaps why
eros in marriage receives no attention there. While this interpretation of the
relationship between sanctified eros and agape does not combine them in the
manner of caritas, which Barth rejected, it does suggest an accommodation between the
two loves that does not seem possible in the context of the 'simul... simul‘ dialectic. Eros
is no longer wholly at enmity with agape, but part of it may be redeemed and sanctified
into something harmonious with it. This weakens the rhetorical power of the opposition
between eros and agape, perhaps, but this is a small cost compared to the difficulties
with the alternatives above, and retains both the uncompromising quality of agape as
the way God loves, and Barth's insight that marriage legitimately includes a different
kind of love alongside this one.
Gene Outka notes a further difficulty regarding the relationship between eros and agape:
that Barth claims that human actions are governed either by eros or by agape, and also
claims that human actions are governed by both eros and agape. Outka concludes that
'nothing very definite is forthcoming about how these claims might conceivably
connect'.21 Barth is aware of the tension between the two assertions:
Man loves either in one way or the other, and he has to choose whether it is to be in
the one way or the other. If in fact he loves in both ways at the same time, as is often
the case even with the Christian, this can only be with the disruption, the 'falling
out', which we had occasion to discuss in relation to 'conversion'.22
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It is illuminating to follow Barth's reference here. In his treatment of conversion, 
Barth describes this 'falling out' - he laments the lack of an English or French 
term to translate Auseinandersetzung - as resulting from the individual being 
under a twofold determination, 'simul (totus) Justus, simul (totus) peccator'.23 
Barth stresses the impossibility of any sort of coexistence between these two 
determinations: 'In the twofold determination of the man engaged in conversion 
we have to do with two total men who cannot be united but are necessarily in 
extreme contradiction. We are confronted with mutually exclusive 
determinations.'24 The situation is untenable: 
 
Its whole will and movement and impulse is to fall out or to fall apart, and to do 
so in the direction unequivocally characterised by the radically different 
content of this twofold determination; not dualistically in a division or 
re-stabilised coexistence of an old man and a new, a sinner and saint; but 
monistically in the passing and death and definitive end and destruction of the 
one in favour of the development and life and exclusive, uncompromised and 
inviolable existence of the other.25 
Applying this back to the relationship between eros and agape makes Barth's 
intentions here clearer. The two loves exist in a dialectical relationship in the 
Christian, who at once loves wholly with eros and wholly with agape, but for 
whom this existence is no easy accommodation, but an experience of being 
totally at odds with himself or herself. Eros is how the world loves: it is creative 
and achieves greatness; in the Greeks it gave insight into human nature as glad 
fellow-humanity; in its form as sexual desire it is familiar and dangerous; it is 
capable of superlative heights of wondrous love of God, but is always finally a 
melancholy love of self. Agape is not merely the antithesis of this worldly love, 
but is a new thing, a joyful giving of ourselves, thereby a renouncing of the idea 
that we belong to ourselves, and an exaltation that we may love as God loves. 
The Christian loves in both these ways, but this is an unhappy and unstable 
tension that must be resolved in the end of eras in the death of the sinner, and 
the exclusive existence of agape in the life of the saint. 
 
The results of considering the difficulties in Barth's account of the relationship between 
eros and agape are mixed. First, there is a genuine difficulty with Barth's description of 
'sanctified' eros. It undermines the opposition he sets up between eros and agape 
 
in IV/2 because it contains elements of each, and, when we seek to locate this hybrid love 
in relation to eros and agape, even the best alternative is not wholly satisfactory. Second, 
the apparent difficulty with the way eros and agape relate to each other in the life of the 
Christian proves not to be problematic. Appropriating the dialectical element from Barth's 
account of conversion results in 
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a consistent and persuasive depiction of the struggle within the Christian between the old 
person and the new, the one whose love turns out always to be love of self, and the one 
who is able to transcend this self-love and love the neighbour for their own sake.26 This 
leads us to the third difficulty in Barth's account of eros and agape in the Dogmatics, 
however, since it is not clear who is to count as our neighbour. 
 
The object of agape 
One of Barth's central questions in his description of Christian love is the question of the 
lawyer in Luke 10:29: 'Who is my neighbour?' His usual answer is that the neighbour is not 
every human being. Love for other persons, Barth argues, 'presupposes that the one or 
many who are loved stand in a certain proximity to the one who loves - a proximity in which 
others do not find themselves'.27 The Bible certainly speaks of relationships with others 
beyond this proximity, but not in terms of love. The issue is then who is in this proximate 
relationship and who is not. Barth addresses this question in the first volume of the 
Dogmatics, with an exegetical treatment of the parable of the Good Samaritan. The 
meaning of the parable is clear, he notes, 'though obstinately surrounded by traditional 
exposition'.28 The parable is told in response to the lawyer asking who his neighbour is, and 
he answers Jesus' question at the end of the parable by identifying the neighbour to the 
wounded man as the one who showed compassion to him.29 Barth draws the obvious but 
nonetheless surprising conclusion that the neighbour is the one who shows compassion to 
us: the true form of the neighbour is 'the bearer and representative of the divine 
compassion'.30 The neighbour 'proclaims and shows forth Jesus Christ within this world',31 
and through my neighbour, 'I am referred to the order in 
which I can and should offer to God ... the absolutely necessary praise which is meet
and acceptable to Him'.32 This means that not everyone is my neighbour: not
everyone stands in this relationship to me. Yet it is not only members of the church
who can be neighbours:
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As the Bible sees it, service of the compassionate neighbour is certainly not
restricted to the life of the Church in itself and as such. It is not restricted to those
members of the Church who are already called and recognizable as such.
Humanity as a whole can take part in this service. The Samaritan in the parable
shows us incontestably that even those who do not know that they are doing so,
or what they are doing, can assume and exercise the function of a compassionate
neighbour.33
It is impossible to be 'absolutely outside the Church', Barth maintains here, since
everyone exists with the church 'in the space between the ascension and the
parousia of Jesus Christ'. Therefore simply as a fellow human being, any person can
be a neighbour to me.34
In the fourth volume of the Dogmatics, Barth is inconsistent regarding who should be
the objects of Christian love. In IV/1, when he turns from the vertical dimension of
Christian love to the horizontal, he clearly means that Christians and non-Christians
should be loved: the love of Jesus Christ is the coming together of all persons with
one another, and 'there is a solidarity of all persons in the fellowship with God in
which they have all been placed in Jesus Christ, and a special solidarity of those
who are aware of the fact, the fellowship of those who believe in God, the Christian
community'.35 In this passage, Barth calls love towards all persons love to the
'neighbour', and love towards other Christians love to the 'brother'. Confusingly,
however, further down the paragraph Barth refers to Matthew 25:31-40: Jesus'
teaching that what persons do to the least of his brothers, they do to him. Barth is
clear that both Christians and non-Christians belong in the category of Jesus'
'brothers'. They represent Jesus Christ
as the neighbour, as the one who fell among thieves, and as the Good
Samaritan... They are not identical with Him. But He cannot be had without them,
nor can reconciliation with Him nor conversion to Him. He cannot be had without
gratitude for their witness and a willingness to be witnesses to them, without love
to them, without their indispensability to each one whom God loves, without that
one seriously setting out and never ceasing to seek and find them, both in the
community and therefore in the world as well, Christian and also non-Christian
neighbours.36
In IV/2, however, Barth gives a different account of who the neighbour is, which does
not fit easily with the Good Samaritan: 'the one who apart from God is loved in the
act of Christian love, being necessarily loved together with God, is the fellow human
being who stands in a definite historical relationship to the Christian who
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loves'.37 This historical relationship is salvation history, so it is only 'those with whom we
find ourselves in this context of the history of salvation' who can be the objects of
Christian love.38 Barth is quick to say there should be no 'restriction in principle' to this
group, as our knowledge of who are neighbours are in this sense is never complete.
Nonetheless, there is a proper 'practical and provisional' restriction of Christian love to
the circle of sisters and brothers in Christ.39
This ambiguity regarding the identity of the Christian's neighbour is the result of Barth's
commitment to affirm the special status of the church in relation to the rest of the world:
It is here in this people that Jesus Christ has His body, the earthly-historical form of
His existence. It is here that God speaks with humanity and is heard by them... His
purpose is for all persons, and He addresses Himself to the whole world. But -
without prejudice to His fatherly providence over all creaturely happening - He does
so here and only here. For it is here that His love is active as an electing, renewing
and creative basis of the response of human love.40
God's love in this community must elicit a response in love that is not found outside it,
and since the neighbour we are called to love is someone in proximity to us, it seems the 
object as well as the subject of this love must be within the church. Yet in the two places 
cited above where Barth introduces the parable of the Good Samaritan, he is forced by 
the text to conclude that our neighbour may be foreign to us. This is the cause of the 
ambiguity we find here in response to the question of who the neighbour is.41 
 
There are two resources earlier in the text of the Dogmatics that help to overcome this 
ambiguity. The first is Barth's claim in the first volume that everyone exists with the 
church between the ascension and parousia of Christ. We share this salvation history 
with all persons - though not all recognize it - and this can be the basis for seeing them 
as proximate to us, and therefore neighbours. We can then say that while we might 
expect to see the fullest expression of Christian love among those who know themselves 
to be called into fellowship by Jesus 
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Christ, the Good Samaritan makes clear that Christians will both find others loving as 
Christians are called to do, and be called themselves to love the stranger wounded at 
the side of the road. The second resource from earlier in the Dogmatics that is helpful 
here is the section 'Near and Distant Neighbours' in III/4.42 There he notes that a 
common language, geographical location, and history mean we are closer to some 
persons than others. We must neither ignore this particularity, nor make it an end in 
itself, but hold onto our near neighbours with one hand and reach out to our distant 
neighbours with the other. Barth resists making near and distant neighbours two 
separate spheres, insisting that we are always on the way from one to the other. He 
seems to have this passage in mind when in IV/2 he suggests Christians 'must be ready 
and on the way to love for all'.43 Using the categories of near and distant neighbours 
allows us to recognize the truth of Barth's claim that love means being in a particular 
relationship with those we find ourselves close to, while recognizing that the categories 
of those close to us and those far from us are fluid, not determinate, and that we must be 
open to being required to love the stranger who suddenly comes near. 
 
With respect to the third difficulty in Barth's account of eros and agape, that of the 
uncertainty in the object of agape, my conclusion is that Barth is ambiguous concerning
whether the objects of Christian love should be restricted to the Christian community,
but that texts elsewhere in the Dogmatics provide grounds for developing a more
nuanced and inclusive theory of how Christian love should be exercised in relation to
those near to and far from us.
Insights for the current debate
Should we model our understanding of Christian love on the parable of the Good
Samaritan or the fellowship of the Last Supper? Is the love we are called to as
Christians exhibited best in stopping to respond to the needs of an anonymous
stranger, or in enjoying the mutual give and take of life in communion? If we believe it
is important to incorporate both the Good Samaritan and the Last Supper narratives in an
account of Christian love, how are we to relate them to each other, and how are we to
deal with conflicts between them?44 These are the central questions in contemporary
discussions of Christian love. Gene Outka is the leading exponent of the former approach,
and sees universality as the definitive
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characteristic of agape.45 Edward Vacek's work is an excellent recent example of the latter
approach, which views Christian love as rooted in the affections.46 Barth's discussion of
eros and agape is a provocative and valuable contribution to this debate, because he
occupies a strange middle ground between the opposing camps. On the one hand, Barth
denies both Outka's contention that we can speak of a universal love of humanity, and
Vacek's view that we can properly understand Christian love by reflection on human
emotions and relationships. On the other hand, Barth both affirms Vacek's belief that
special relationships are the essence of Christian love, and emphasizes that these special
relationships must be extensible to all persons, in the direction of the love for all with
which Outka begins. Barth's insight that we can only love those who stand in some
kind of proximity to us, together with his account of our dialectical relationship to our
near and distant neighbours, is suggestive of a way to proceed that affirms the value and
legitimacy of special relationships, while also recognizing that any person or group, near 
or distant, may become the neighbour Christ commands us to love as ourselves. 
 
Advocates of the importance of special relationships commonly rely on marriage and 
family as the clearest confirmation of their case. It is instructive, then, that the central 
special relationship for Barth is that between members of the church. Agape cannot be 
reduced to a universal love of humanity because that would radically weaken the 
meaning of the love whose high calling is to bind together the body of Christ.47 The love 
of Christians for one another is a mutual witness to the love of God, interposing 
themselves for each other and acting as guarantors for one other, a task that cannot 
have the same meaning with regard to those outside the church.48 We should not pass 
by this point without appreciating the scale of the challenge this view of agape 
represents for the love that should be evident in the church. While the love within the 
church is the most important special relationship according to Barth, we have seen that 
he also recognizes the special status of love within marriage, and is prepared to create a 
'sanctified eras' for it, despite the difficulties this creates for the opposition between ems 
and agape he maintains in IV/2. In the section on near and distant neighbours in III/4, he 
also considers the special relationship we have with those who share our language, 
geographical location, and history.49 
 
 
[Top of page 202] 
 
 
Barth never directly contradicts his rejection of Christian love as a universal love of 
humanity, but I have shown that he is equivocal about the identity of the neighbour, and 
in IV/1 clearly states that love of the neighbour is love towards all persons, Christian and 
non-Christian. It is significant that this passage refers to the Good Samaritan: it is as if 
the text is driving Barth to the inclusive view of Christian love he shies away from 
elsewhere. This parable is the reason we cannot draw the boundaries of Christian love 
at the church, or the family, or the nation. The Samaritan was of a different religion and 
nationality from the man left wounded at the side of the road, yet came to his aid and 
was a neighbour to him. Barth's insight here is that love for other persons, 'presupposes 
that the one or many who are loved stand in a certain proximity to the one who loves - a 
proximity in which others do not find themselves'.50 The way beyond the 
exclusivity of our relationships with those of our faith, family, or nation, therefore, is not to
assert that we ought to or can love those who are not our neighbours, but to expand
the category of neighbours, which is what Barth does in refusing to draw a clear
distinction between those who are near and distant from us. We cannot love those who
are not in some kind of proximity to us, but we are called to be always on our way
between those who are near to us and those who are far away. The English translation
of the Kirchliche Dogmatik captures this idea in a near-paradoxical expression that
goes beyond Earth in the German. The heading of the third section of §54 in III/4 is 'Die
Nahe und Die Fernen' in the Dogmatik, literally, The Near and the Far'. We have
already seen the English heading, 'Near and Distant Neighbours'. No doubt this is a
fair rendition of the original, yet 'near neighbour' is close to redundancy and 'distant
neighbour' is close to oxymoron. 'Distant neighbour', however, renders exactly the point
that we may be in proximity to those who are far from us. Christ does not command us to
love humanity in the abstract, but our neighbour, the one who stand in proximity to us. But
Barth insists we may not rest content in our circle of those close to us, but must
always be moving between our 'near neighbours' and our 'distant neighbours'.
'Neighbour' therefore becomes a category of special relations that is neither rendered
meaningless by an abstract universality, nor made exclusive of those beyond our
'neighbourhood', but reminds us that we are called to love the foreigner as the
Samaritan did, while recognizing that we have church neighbours, family neighbours,
neighbours in our nation, near neighbours, and other kinds of neighbours, alongside
our distant neighbours.
These twin commitments - that we can only love those who are in some way proximate
to us, and that we can have a certain proximity to those distant neighbours we are
always on our way to - do not solve the problem of how to understand special relations
in an account of Christian love, but they do represent an approach to the topic that
seems promising and that has not previously been explored, and this may be Barth's
major contribution to the current understanding of Christian love. Two other aspects of
the interpretation of Barth's account of
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Christian love I have developed in this article are also worth considering in 
relation to the contemporary debate. First, his description of 'sanctified eros' will 
be useful as an example of how eros may be incorporated into a theology of 
marriage, combining as it does the claim that the eras that is always grasping 
self-love at its root has no proper place in the life of the children of God, and the 
claim that an account of Christian marriage that does not recognize the legitimate 
place of attraction and desire fails to see man and woman in their real encounter, 
which must always be erotic. Second, the dialectical impossibility, yet reality, of 
the presence of both ems and agape in the life of the Christian is a dynamic 
model of how we may approach the relationship between eros and agape in the 
context of Christian anthropology. 
 
It is perhaps unsurprising that Barth's treatment of eros and agape in the 
Dogmatics is complex and initially problematic, given that he addressed the topic 
piecemeal over the course of twenty years.51 The initial difficulties of the definition 
of eros, the relationship between eros and agape, and the object of agape, can, 
however, largely be resolved by a careful reading of Barth within the context of 
the Dogmatics. Once this work has been accomplished, making Barth a 
participant in the current debate makes clear the originality, perspicuity, and 
suggestive character of his depiction of Christian love. 
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